How Do We Fix The Navy? — Free advice worth lots more than you paid for it

“How do we fix the Navy?” Asked David Ignatius of the Chief of Naval Operations. Ignatius, once a friendly conduit for CIA leaks, was conducting the interview at the CNO's request for The Washington Post. The CNO, Admiral Gilday, covered several critical topics, but only one interested me. It had been my pet peeve for twenty-five years, and though the admiral hadn't made it the centerpiece of his comments, he had pushed it. For me, an obscure retired commander from a small state, that was gratifying.

The subject, and the peeve, is the Goldwater-Nichols Military Reform Act. This law does several things, but I'm concerned with only one, that which does the greatest damage to the US Navy. The bare bones of the law require that all US military officers become joint duty qualified, which means an officer must attend two levels of joint political military eduction (JPME), to wit, war colleges, and serve at least two joint tours of duty (the Joint Staff will do, but there are field commands as well).

How did this come about? I won't say that your guess is as good as mine; I believe I know. Back in the early 80s we invaded the island of Grenada in order to free it from the clutches of Cuban influence, and rescue American medical students studying there. During the invasion, the Navy couldn't communicate with the Army or Air Force, and the panacea that would fix the resulting minor public scandal was Goldwater-Nichols.

Here's the real story. By the time the US had decided to invade Grenada, we had discovered the existence of the John Walker spy ring. As a result we knew that the Soviets were able to read much of our military communications, especially our Navy comms. Prior to the invasion, an amphibious ready group departed the east coast en route a previously scheduled Med deployment. After departure they assumed complete electronic silence, communicating via flag hoist, flashing light, and messages exchanged by helicopter. This was to be the Grenada invasion force. They were a true covert force. Operating in such secrecy, they were in no position to coordinate with outside forces, but they were adequate to the task, and their secrecy meant that the Cubans on the island had no idea they were coming. The problem: Given that this was the only war to be had, the Army and Air Force insisted on getting a piece of the action.

From the confusion of not being able to coordinate operations due to radio silence came the theory that our forces couldn't work well together. The reason the “joint” side of this operation was such a mess was the necessity of maintaining the covertness of the amphibious force. Normally, a joint operation would have involved advanced operational communication and planning that wasn't feasible under these circumstances.

From this has evolved the current jointness craze, and the bureaucratization of warfare into such memorable ideas as “Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons.” Prior to this it would have been known simply as “Maritime Operations.”

Why is this so toxic to the Navy — more than to the other services? Naval officers don't just fight their ships, they must sail them in peace and war. They are mariners as well as naval officers. When an armor officer concludes an operation, his tanks go on transporters or rail cars and are ferried back to post to minimize wear. Naval officers deploy their ships for six to nine months at a time, in peace and war. They must contend with maritime traffic in the sea lanes under all circumstances, day and night. They occasionally must enter strange ports, often under hazardous navigational conditions.

All this requires broad training and experience afloat that develops not just leadership skills, but seamanship skills and judgement. No amount of schooling can substitute, nor can a short refresher afloat replace years of experience as a seaman. It is true that the chief and senior petty officers are the technical experts of the Navy, but the Navy's excellence has always rested on the fulcrum of its officers' command of its complex technical systems as well as their strong leadership. Though Navy leadership may deny it, the fact of life in an officer's career is now to not spend any more time at sea than is absolutely necessary in order to ensure he or she can punch critical joint career tickets on the way to a hoped for advancement to flag rank.

Fixing this would require a true rebellion. The jointness craze (and it is a craze — everything must incorporate the joint term in its name to succeed) has been ongoing for so long that the entire US military is transfused with true joint believers. They shuffle through tours in the ever more bloated Joint Staff and Combatant Commanders (the Flag Officers who were called CINCs until Rumsfeld decided that there could be only one Commander in Chief). They produce more and more 'plans' and 'position papers' in the approved format. It's too bad they can't shoot that stuff from artillery tubes.

All this shows clearly in the accident rates of surface ships at sea. Those familiar with the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea are aware of how fundamental were the mistakes in recent Navy incidents, and how preventable the deaths and millions of dollars lost repairing damaged ships due to collisions.

There is no substitute for experience.